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Arbitration is one of the main dispute resolution tools for commercial disputes and has, as 
well, emerged as of a certain importance and interest for investor-state disputes since the 1990s, 
when a large number of BITs were concluded. Investment arbitration has been chosen or granted as 
an alternative to litigation in host-state courts for several reasons. It has been perceived in most 
cases, as a fast, independent, long-term money-saving but costly procedure based in legal arguments 
rather than in states’ politics and their domestic court’s subsequent suspected dependence. 
Additionally, Cody Olson notes “the regime of investor-state arbitration and commercial arbitration 
more generally, is rooted in mutual consent” (2011:716). It is because of the element of mutual 
consent running through investment arbitration that the parties should be voluntarily complying 
with the arbitral award. However, even if this seems to be a logical conclusion, in practice, there 
have been cases
1
 to which the winning party had to resort to enforcement proceedings to collect the 
money of the award or to enforce its non-pecuniary aspects. Those proceedings are subject to 
different legal regimes providing for enforcement, which depend on the jurisdiction where it is 
sought. Despite the promising declarations of the different alternatives for enforcement if the 
investor does not go under a thorough research of them, it might end up in spending large sum of 
money without always being successful in enforcing the award.  
The available enforcement legal regimes are to be analyzed in this essay. There will be a 
reference to the ICSID Convention regime for enforcement of investment arbitral awards, to the 
New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which is a non 
specialized regime for investment arbitral awards, but covers commercial and investment arbitral 
awards and to the possibility to enforce arbitral awards rendered by ad hoc tribunals. However, the 
analysis of these regimes would be in vain if no reference to the general principles of immunity law 
was made. The distinction between immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from execution will 
be introduced, the different doctrines of state immunity and their intertwining with the enforcement 
of international investment arbitral awards against States. Within the section of immunity law it will 
be made a reference to the assets covered from immunity from enforcement and how to distinguish 
them; it will be attempted to demonstrate it through case law.  
Finally, it is necessary to list down the alternatives provided when the attempts to enforce 
the award according to the abovementioned legal regimes have failed, in order to press the 
recalcitrant state to comply.  
 
                                                 
1
 These cases do not represent the majority of investment arbitration, but it is important to be highlighted. 
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I. General principles of immunity law 
 
 In the case of a private dispute, we are familiar with the equality of the parties, in respect to 
their legal position. However, when one of the parties is a State, a sovereign unity or a state 
controlled entity this equilibrium of legal positions might be disturbed and unbalanced. There have 
been several attempts in international level in order to deal with this problematic, so that 
international commerce and investments could be enhanced and flourish. However, we will 
concentrate on the field of international arbitration, either commercial or investment
2
. Among these 
efforts has been the ICSID Convention, the various institutional arbitration rules, the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards etc. However, the 
point where the inequality of the parties is more prominent is when it comes to enforcement of the 
award against States. A sovereign unity has certain kind of defenses to invoke, when it comes to 
enforcing the arbitral award and its name is sovereign immunity. 
 It is necessary in order to understand the impediment of sovereign immunity into enforcing 
arbitral awards to run through the doctrines and distinction of sovereign immunity. Firstly, we have 
to note that sovereign immunity is part of public international law. It can be part of international 
treaties, attempting to regulate it in a homogenous way, such as the European Convention on 
Sovereign Immunity
3
 and the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property
4
 or part of the international customary law (Bjorklund 2010:215). Additionally, immunity 
law can be found in state level, where it is called national or municipal immunity law. 
 Sovereign immunity can be perceived either in a broad sense described by the phrase “the 
sovereign cannot be sued without its consent” or respectively in a narrow sense were national courts 
of one state are prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over other states in the absence of their 
consent (Olson 2011:734-5). Those differences can be condensed in the evolution of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. In the past, it was found in its absolute form, according to which immunity 
could not be waived, irrespective of the nature of the dispute, but only with the consent of the State.  
                                                 
2 There is an absolute necessity in this essay to take in to consideration commercial arbitration, as well, due to 
two reasons. It is that it can be described as the foundation for the development of investment arbitration. The first 
reason is the preexistence of various international efforts and legal texts concerning commercial arbitration, in 
comparison to investment arbitration and the second reason is the application of international treaties, which at first 
aimed to the facilitation of commercial arbitration, but are to by applied in investment arbitration as well, f.i. Non-
pecuniary obligations set by an investment arbitral award are to be enforced by applying the New York Convention. 
3 Adopted in the 16th of May 1972, signed and ratified by 8 States, therefore is not a very popular international 
treaty. It entered into force in 11th of June 1976 
4 Adopted in 2nd of December 2004, but has not yet entered into force 
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However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity through “state practice over the last several decades” 
as Bjorklund highlights (2010:212-3) has undergone several transformations and is nowadays 
mostly found in its restrictive version, which dictates that “a foreign state is entitled to immunity 
only with respect to its public acts”. 
 Public acts are thought to be the quintessence of a States function, those acts are defined by 
the imperium, the exercise of sovereign power and they are usually called acte jure imperii. On the 
opposite side, are to be found the acts of the State, which it performs as a fiscus. Those are the acts 
when the State engages in commercial activity, for instance when it rents a property it owns, when it 
is thought to be acting as a private party, those acts are usually described as acte jure gestionis. As 
Bjorklund underlines “the distinction between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis has bedeviled 
courts seeking to apply the restrictive theory of immunity for jurisdictional purposes, and the status 
of the proceeds derived from, or intended to be used for, those activities is no different.” 
(2010:226). This distinction is important because acte jure imperii cannot be the object of a dispute 
and are enjoying immunity. However, in the case of investment arbitration there are definitely 
elements in the activity of the state that derive from its imperium, for instance a contract for the 
exploitation of natural resources is intertwined with the imperium of the State as natural resources 
are in most jurisdictions property of the State. 
 
a. Immunity from jurisdiction v. Immunity from enforcement 
 Moreover, in order to elaborate on the topic of this essay we must shed light on the most 
important distinction concerning sovereign immunity. The distinction between immunity from 
jurisdiction and immunity from enforcement; jurisdictional immunity is expressed by the fact that a 
State cannot be sued and enter in a dispute resolution in a jurisdiction other that of its own. The only 
case it will be subject to another State's jurisdiction or to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is if 
its acts are de jure gestionis or if it has waived its immunity from jurisdiction. In addition, immunity 
from execution is the prohibition of enforcing a court decision or respectively an arbitral award 
against the sovereign. By analogy, those two can be referenced to specific stages of an arbitral 
dispute, jurisdictional immunity with the stage of recognition and immunity from enforcement with 
the stage of enforcement of the arbitral award
5
. In general a State's consent to arbitration either as a 
provision in a Bilateral Investment Treaty, other international treaties, such as the ICSID 
Convention, or an arbitration clause in a concession contract are thought to be an implied or explicit 
waiver of jurisdiction, but not extending to execution. This has been the point in SOABI v. Senegal, 
an ICSID award, which was attempted to be enforced in France. The French Supreme Court 
                                                 
5 Olson 2011:735 
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reaffirmed that as a matter of French law "a foreign State which has consented to arbitration has 
thereby agreed that the award may be granted recognition, which does not constitute a measure of 
execution that might raise issues pertaining to the immunity of the state concerned." In other words, 
the Supreme Court maintained that consent to arbitration by a state constitutes an implicit waiver of 
immunity from suit, but has no bearing on immunity from execution (Nmehielle 2001: 32-33).  
In addition, it must be highlighted that there have been a few cases where the argument for an 
implied waiver from execution stemming from investment treaties has been a successful one
6
, 
which is to be analyzed below. 
 A further point made by several authors is that enforcement is constituted by two stages the 
first which is the attachment of the assets and the second which is the execution, the actual seizure 
and transfer of property (Olson 2011:734, Nmehielle 2001:34).  
A discussion upon the difference between enforcement and execution has also arisen concerning the 
ICSID Convention, while in the effort of interpreting it. In its English version the use of this two 
words is used as if it has to do with to different concepts, however the further examination of the, as 




 While, trying to enforce an investment arbitral award against a State the investor must 
before everything else demonstrate a waiver of immunity by the State in respect with the 
execution
8
. In relation to the abovementioned differentiation between enforcement and execution, 
Nmehielle marks that “enforcement of an award against a state falls under the immunity from 
jurisdiction, while immunity from execution comes into play when actual execution measures are 
sought” (2001:34).   If such a waiver of execution immunity is not provided the investor must 
examine whether the asset is protected, under the law of where it is located, by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, which would respectively enlist it as non-attachable
9
 and if “it may properly be 
treated as property of the debtor sovereign” (Olson 2011:740). It is also a possibility that a State 
might have earmarked certain assets to satisfy an eventual award; therefore an attempt to enforce it 
over those seems to be more successful.  
 
b. Immunity from execution and State property 
 In general, immunity can be inherent in the state's assets and thus execution over them can 
                                                 
6 See on this topic Bjorklund 2010:211 
7 Bjorklund 2010:216 
8 Bjorklund 2010:223 






. The most commonly found tests to determine if the assets are free from immunity 
from execution are: a) the nature of activity test and b) the nature of fund test (Cane 2004:452). 
Additionally, it is possible to narrow immunity from enforcement through the restrictive doctrine of 
sovereign immunity
11
, by applying the most widely accepted criterion that of examining the purpose 
of the assets that are subjected to enforcement (Olson 2011:740), although the origin of the assets is 
sometimes, as well, taken into account (UNCTAD 2003a: 21).  
One of the first distinctions made concerning the assets is to characterize them either as 
commercial or non-commercial property. Therefore an easy, but in practice naïve, conclusion is that 
commercial assets are excluded from immunity from enforcement, as they are not to be serving a 
public purpose. This kind of non-immunity provisions concerning commercial assets are to be 
found in United Kingdom's, Australian and Canadian legislation on sovereign immunity and on 
French court practice
12
. However, even if it seems to be a clear conclusion practice in some cases 
has overturned it.  
 Unfortunately, commercial assets are not easy to be located and following that; the investor 
seeking to enforce must be able to respond to the State's argument that those assets are not serving 
governmental or official purposes. When the assets are serving the abovementioned purposes there 
are usually, according to the municipal immunity law, covered by immunity from execution and are 
non-attachable. In Letco v. Liberia
13
, the investor, Letco, tried to attach bank accounts held by the 
Embassy of Republic of Liberia in Washington D.C. in an attempt to enforce over tonnage and 
registration fees collected in the United States from ship-owners flying the Liberian flag. However, 
according to the District Court of Columbia, money and property that is to serve a public purpose is 
immune from execution, according to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in reference 
to the nature of the bank accounts and according to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) in 
reference to the sovereign nature of the tax revenue collected from the ship-owners. Thus, the Court 
concluded that “some portion of the funds in the bank accounts may be used for commercial 
activities in connection with running the Embassy, such as transactions to purchase goods or 
services from private entities. The legislative history of the FSIA indicates that these funds would be 
                                                 
10 Bjorklund 2010:211 
11 It should be noted that when it comes to test immunity from jurisdiction the most widely used criterion is to 
examine the activity of the State, whether it is an act jure imperii, that cannot as such be subjected to the crisis of 
another country's court and whether it is an act jure gestionis and therefore by waiving or having an implied waiver of 
jurisdictional immunity the State becomes a litigant in its State's courts. 
12 UNCTAD 2003a:20 
13 There are US District Court decisions published in regard to the LETCO enforcement proceedings: (1) US 
District Court, Southern District of New York, 5 September 1986, (2) US District Court, Southern District of New York, 
12 December 1986, (3)  US District Court, District of Columbia,16 April 1987 (Alexandroff & Laird 2008: 1176-1177). 
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used for a commercial activity and not be immune from attachment. The Court, however, declines to 
order that if any portion of a bank account is used for a commercial activity then the entire account 
loses its immunity. ... On the contrary, following the narrow definition of “commercial activity,” 
funds used for commercial activities which are “incidental” or “auxiliary,” not denoting the 
essential character of the use of the funds in question, would not cause the entire bank account to 
lose its mantle of sovereign immunity”, thus the funds could not be segregated and execution was 
refused. It is worth of noting that in its reasoning the Court mentioned the Birch Shipping Corp. v. 
Embassy of the Republic of Tanzania, a previous judgment, which had similar facts, but had a 
different outcome. Nmehielle marks that “as in LETCO, the account was used for different 
purposes, one of which was commercial. The court concluded that the funds could be segregated 
and that attachment was therefore permissible” (2001:37); however the Court in the Letco case 
differentiated from that precedent.  
 Another case that is indicative of the principle of enforcement over a State’s commercial 
assets and respectively its deficiencies is the enforcement proceedings arising out of the Sedelmayer 
v. Russian Federation arbitration. Russia's refusal to comply with the award led to a long period of 
enforcing proceedings, more than 30 attempts of execution, in different jurisdictions. Some of those 
are very useful for the distinction made at this point. Mr. Sedelmayer attempted in the German 
Courts to execute over Lufthansa Airlines' payments to Russia for over flights of Russian airspace 
but it failed on the grounds that "[o]verflight rights . . . were deemed to be of a public character and 
not private law contract-type claims and were, therefore, not subject to internal 
execution."(Alexandroff & Laird 2008: 1183-1184). One of his successes was the tracing of a 
former KGB compound in Cologne, which had been rented out by Russia, in a commercial basis, 
thus he was able to collect the rent payments and seize the property in order to collect the revenue 
from its eventual sale
14 
.  
 Additionally, a notable case has been AIG Partners v Kazakhstan, AIG made an attempt to 
be granted interim charging orders and third-party debt orders, in United Kingdom, in respect of 
certain securities and cash, held by third parties, on behalf of the National Bank of Kazakhstan, 
based on an ICSID award. The High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, ruled, firstly, that all 
property of a Central Bank is immune from execution according to UK's Sovereign Immunity Act, 
irrespective of the purpose or the means they are held and, secondly, even if the property was of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan and the securities might have been for a commercial purpose, “since the 
management of the state's economy and revenue constitutes a sovereign activity”, the court did not 
                                                 
14 Alexandroff & Laird 2008:1184, Olson 2011: 741 
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have jurisdiction to grant those orders
15
 (Alexandroff & Laird 2008:1181-1182). Property of central 
banks and other monetary authorities are usually provided with special protection by the national 
statutes dealing with State immunity
16
. Concluding on this point, it is worth mentioning that it is a 
matter of principle that an award rendered against a State can be enforced only against its 
commercial property. In addition, a distinction must be made between the State’s property and that 
of state-owned companies. This has been one among several subjects in the Benvenuti & Bonfant v. 
Congo judgment of the French Court of Cassation. The investor tried to enforce in France the 
ICSID award against funds owned by a stated owned company, the Banque Commerciale 
Conogolaise (BCC) and not against the property of Congo itself. The Court “held that Benvenuti & 
Bonfant was the creditor of the State of Congo but not BCC. The bank, though dependent on the 
State, could not be regarded as an emanation of the State of the Congo. The control exercised by the 
State was not sufficient to regard it as an emanation of that State.” (UNCTAD 2003a: 14). 
 
c. Waiver from execution immunity 
 An important issue to be addressed is that of a possible waiver from execution immunity 
provided by the State. When the waiver from execution immunity is explicit the outcome seems to 
be predictable. It is in the case of an implied waiver that the condition becomes more complex and 
interesting. 
 A waiver from execution immunity is not what a State would traditionally go for. However, 
it might be possible, but this is usually related to the bargaining power of the parties. As it has been 
observed by Nmehielle “experience has shown that though waivers of immunity in economic 
development agreements vary from case to case, waivers of immunity are commonplace in 
transnational loan agreements” (2001:39), this is an outcome of the imbalance of bargaining power, 
as States in the latter case are actually in need of getting the loan, they stipulate on the waiver of 
immunity clause. Such a waiver can be found in international treaties, for instance it is found in the 
UN Convention on Jurisdiction Immunities of States and Their Property which has an “arbitration 
exception providing that written agreements to arbitrate effectuate waivers of immunity in court 
proceedings supporting the arbitration, including enforcement measures, so long as the arbitration 
agreement relates to a “commercial transaction” ”; according to the drafters of the convention, as 
annexed, an investment is perceived to be within the meaning of commercial transactions 
(Bjorklund 2010:222). 
 As Bjorklund has noted “the success of an implied waiver argument will depend on the 
                                                 
15 This is the point made above about the immunity of acte jure imperii 
16 UNCTAD 2003a: 23 
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municipal state immunity law in the jurisdiction where the victor seeks to enforce the award.” 
(2010:223-224), as it is for the national courts according to the doctrine they are following to 
evaluate the argument. 
 An implied waiver from execution immunity might be argued when the arbitration has taken 
place under a specific set of institutional rules, as stipulated in the arbitration agreement, and is to 
be enforced under the New York Convention.  This argument has been successful in the case of 
Societe Creighton v. Ministere des Finances de l"Etat du Qatar, the award was rendered under the 
ICC Rules of Arbitration and it was attempted to be enforced in France under the provisions of the 
New York Convention. On the aspect of the implied waiver of execution immunity, the Court of 
Cassation ruled that be agreeing to arbitrate under the ICC Rules, which provide, under current 
numeration, Article 34 (6) that “every award shall be binding on the parties. By submitting the 
dispute to arbitration under the Rules, the parties undertake to carry out any award without delay 
and shall be deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can 
validly be made.”17, it had impliedly waived immunity from execution. Concerning this decision 
Cane comments that it “leads one to think that although Article 2818 of the ICC Rules appears to be 
more vague than Article 54 of the ICSID Convention, the courts are sensitive to its binding force 
and the commitment of the parties, especially if the State party undertakes to submit to arbitration 
and accept its consequences when the agreement is made” (2004:455). 
 It has been observed that an implied waiver argument may be successful when the 
enforcement of the investment arbitral award is sought according to the New York Convention as 
there is no specific reference made to the execution immunity, such as the one found in the 












                                                 
17 Bjorklund 2010:224 
18 This is according to the numeration of the ICC Rules of 1998. 
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II. ICSID arbitral awards 
 
The ICSID Convention is providing for a system to resolve investment disputes, as well as, the 
legal concept and provisions dominating the process of dispute resolution and its outcome. It is 
embodying the norms of public international law, international arbitration and investment law, each 
one of them intertwining with the other. It is necessary to bear in mind that in order an award to be 
issued according to the ICSID Convention the host of the investment state must be a signatory state 
that has ratified the Convention and that the home state of the investor has also signed and ratified 
it, otherwise it could be either an ad hoc arbitration or an institutional arbitration not bearing the 
special character of an ICSID award. Additionally, a party to an ICSID arbitration can also be a 
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State, either designated by the State to the Center 
as such (Art, 25(1)), or by the State's approval when it deemed necessary (Art. 25(3)).   
The contribution of the ICSID Convention with regard to recognition and enforcement has been 
distinctive, as it has been designed to be technically independent from domestic and international 
rules. It has been noted by Cane that “the ICSID Convention excludes all traditional means of 
control of an award, and “there is no exception (not even on the grounds of public policy) to the 
final and binding character of an ICSID award” (2004:444). 
When it comes to the enforcement of international investment arbitral awards, it is necessary to 
make an introduction to Section 6 of the ICSID Convention, where the subjects of recognition and 
enforcement of the awards are addressed.  
Following the structure of Section 6, we see that with Article 53 ICSID Convention the first 
element to be established is the binding force and finality of the award:  
(1) The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other 
remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply with the 
terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the 
relevant provisions of this Convention. 
(2) For the purposes of this Section, “award” shall include any decision interpreting, revising or 
annulling such award pursuant to Articles 50, 51 or 52.   
 
Article 53 is not only establishing the final and binding character of the award issued but 
also the obligation of the Contracting Party, State, to treat the award as such. Thus, firstly, the award 
is to be recognized by States as having the status of a final judicial decision
19
, as no other remedy is 
permitted in domestic level, but only the ones described in the Convention. It also creates the 
                                                 
19 UNCTAD 2003a: 7 
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obligation to perceive it, from a legal point, as such in any other stage, like the enforcement stage. 
Secondly, the State parties are subject to the duty of compliance with the award (Olson 2011:725), 
even if State immunity is invoked.  
The abovementioned element is a result of the international nature of the obligation 
established by Article 53, an obligation embodied in a multilateral international treaty. The 
consequences, in case of infringement of this international obligation, are designated in the 
reasoning of the ad hoc Committee in Mine v. Guinea: 
“25. … It should be clearly understood, …, that State immunity may well afford a legal defense to 
forcible execution, but provides neither argument nor excuse for failing to comply with an award. In 
fact, the issue of State immunity from forcible execution of an award will typically arise if the State 
party refuses to comply with its treaty obligations. Non-compliance by a State constitutes a violation 
by the State of its international obligations and will attract sanctions. The Committee refers in this 
connection among other things to Article 27 and 64 of the Convention, and to the consequences 
which such a violation would have for such a State's reputation with private and public sources of 
international finance.”20 
The ad hoc committee in Mitchell v. DR Congo repeats this position:  
“The immunity of a State from execution (Article 55 of the Convention) does not exempt it from 
enforcing the award, given its formal commitment in this respect following signature of the 
Convention. If it does not enforce the award, its behaviour is subject to various indirect sanctions. 
Precisely, reference is made to Articles 27 and 64 of the Convention. The investor' s State has the 
rights, according to Article 27, to exercise diplomatic protection against the State which does not 
respect its obligation to enforce an arbitral award of the Center; but also, according to Article 64, 
to have recourse to the International Court of Justice. Moreover, a State's refusal to enforce an 
ICSID award may have a negative effect on the State's position in the international community with 
respect to the continuation of international financing or thee inflow of other investments.”21.  
Even though, those maybe some of the sanctions imposed to the non-complying with the 
award State there are not thought to be the most effective. The possible measures to put pressure on 
recalcitrant states will be analyzed in following Section IV. 
Additionally, immunity from execution is not lifting the duty, set by Article 53, of the State 
to comply with the award, as it “is merely a procedural bar to measures of execution”(UNCTAD 
2003a: 18). 
                                                 
20 Interim Order No1. On Guinea's Application for Stay of Enforcement of the Award, 12 Augoust 1988, para. 25, 4 
ICSID Reports 115/6 




Subsequently, it is Article 54 that will be the center of our interest in relevance to the subject 
of this essay, as it is the element which distinguishes ICSID awards from any other, attributing them 
the direct and immediate recognition and enforceability without any other prior procedure for 
transposing them in the respective domestic legal order
22
.  
It is Article 54(1) ICSID Convention that is expressly providing for the general obligation of 
the parties to recognize and enforce the awards rendered by the Tribunal according to the 
Convention: 
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as 
binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it 
were a final judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting State with a federal constitution may 
enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat 
the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state. 
Analyzing paragraph 1 of this Article we have to point out the following aspects: 
1. The obligation to recognize ICSID awards automatically without subjecting them to 
any other conditions
23
:   
What we can understand by the content of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 54, is that there is a 
waiver of jurisdictional immunity of a sovereign State in regard to recognition proceedings, 
because, as G. Cane (2004:441) states, “a party seeking enforcement merely needs to file with the 
competent court a copy of the award certified by the Secretary-General of ICSID and this entitles 
the party to a leave for enforcement
24”. The process of recognizing the award has become much 
easier under the ICSID Convention, as it is, without any further prerequisites, but by just filing a 
copy, transposed in the domestic legal order where the winning party seeks to enforce it. Thus, by 
holding a recognized ICSID award the winning party is in possession of an executory title 
(Nmehielle 2001:30). 
2. The obligation to immediately enforce the pecuniary aspects of the awards, leaving 
aside any other ruling found in the award:  
The legal obligation under Article 54 paragraph 1 to enforce the award in the territory of the 
                                                 
22  As it will be later discussed international arbitral awards whether of a commercial or an investment nature in order 
to be recognized and enforced in another legal order than that they have been issued they have to be recognized and 
enforced according to the New York Convention for Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) 
by the competent court of the state where execution is sought at the moment of the application or in the future. 
23 This point and the following are the elements of originality found in ICSID Convention concerning recognition and 
enforcement of awards, distinguishing it from other conventions such as the New York Convention and sterengthens the 
argument of the creation of a special and particular regime. 
24 The leave for enforcement under the ICSID Convention is limited to pecuniary obligations as it is described below. 
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contracting state, party to the investment or contracting party to the Convention, is limited only to 
pecuniary obligations, this, first of all, comes into contrast with the obligation to recognize the 
award that covers all the obligations consisting the award, pecuniary or non-pecuniary. Regarding 
the non-pecuniary obligations
25
 found in an ICSID award, it is not that they will remain 
unenforceable but they will not enjoy the enforcement regime of pecuniary obligations, as described 
above. If the State where enforcement is sought is a contracting party to the New York Convention, 
enforcement of non-pecuniary obligations is possible because “Article III of the New York 
Convention does not contain any such distinction (between pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
obligations), therefore, the only way to get due execution of the award would be to seek application 
of the New York Convention”26.  The procedure to be followed will be to file with the competent 
court a copy of the award duly certified by the Secretary-General of ICSID, so that the award is 
recognized and submit a petition for recognition and enforcement of the non-pecuniary obligations. 
In this case, the eligibility given by the ICSID Convention to the award is abolished and further 
conditions such as the ones set by the New York Convention have to be fulfilled, such as the check 
of the award in a domestic level (dual step of the New York Convention), otherwise recognition and 
enforcement will not be granted. In case the State of enforcement is also a contracting party to the 
ICSID Convention, then the non-pecuniary obligations will be recognized without the domestic 
check, which will be taking place only for the aspect of their enforcement.   
3. The attribution to the award of the status of a final decision rendered by each States 
party’ s courts; which means that no other prerequisites are to be checked, such as those in Article 
V of the New York Convention, in order to transpose the award in the national legal order  
 
However, it is in following Articles 54 paragraph 3 and 55 that the loophole of the ICSID 
awards regime arises, where the legal provisions for enforcement of the award are laid out. Those 
two Articles have to be analyzed and interpreted the one in connection to the other, in order to shed 
light in the vacuum created, and this is because Article 55  is perceived to be “a clarification and 
authentic interpretation of the previous article” (Cane 2004:452). 
Article 54 paragraph 3 provides for: 
Execution of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution of judgments in 
force in the State in whose territories such execution is sought. 
While Article 55 adds: 
Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any 
                                                 
25 Non-pecunary obligations are  "to do" obligations that fall into four general categories: obtaining evidence, securing 
financial guarantees, preventing hostile propaganda, and enjoining parallel domestic proceedings (Cane 2004:456). 
26 Cane 2004:456 
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Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or any foreign State from execution. 
 
The concluding point is that even if the ICSID Convention is an effort to delocalize and de-
politicize disputes and arbitration, so that there are not subjected to local interests and politics, it 
subjects execution of the awards to national laws of the state where execution is sought, by the 
renvoi provision on the abovementioned articles; thus execution is once again limited (Cane 
2004:442, Bjorklund 2010:217). Moreover, another point to be drew is that the ICSID Convention 
provides for the law to be implemented in execution of an award, therefore there is no space left for 
an argument of an implied waiver of immunity from execution, as many authors have pointed out
27
. 
Under Article 55, State's immunity from execution remains unaffected (UNCTAD 2003a:5), thus 
the investor wanting to enforce should look into the national law on sovereign immunity, of the 
state where he is about to enforce and the doctrine the state of enforcement adopts. By the 
interpretation of those two Articles it is made clear that national laws intervene only at the execution 
stage, therefore as long as it concerns recognition of the award, no more conditions should be 
required by the State of enforcement. This is laid out at the Benvenuti & Bonfant v. Congo where 
“the Court of Appeal of Paris, in striking down the limiting condition set by the lower court, 
focused exactly on the difference between the two stages, enforcement and execution of the award. 
The Court pointed out that the order granting recognition and enforcement to an arbitral award, 
covered by Article 54, is a different step from the possible subsequent step of execution covered by 
Article 55.”28.  
Even if the ICSID Convention has been an attempt to create an independent regime for 
international investment arbitration, the application of the New York Convention even in the case of 
an ICSID award maybe necessary.  As it has been mentioned above this is the case when there is a 
non-pecuniary obligation to be enforced or “when the State in the territory of which enforcement is 
sought is not a party to the Washington Convention but is a party to the New York 
Convention”(Cane 2004:445). However, in this case the success of an implied waiver of execution 
immunity due to the arbitrating State being a part into the New York Convention is not viable. This 
comes as a consequence of the host-State being a party and arbitrating according to the ICSID 
Convention that has an explicit reference in Articles 54(3) and 55 to the issue of sovereign 
immunity from execution. 
A point of confusion in the application of the ICSID Convention has been the difference 
between the terms enforcement and execution. Those terms are found in Articles 54 and 55 of the 
                                                 
27 See Bjorklund 2010:212, Cane 2004:452 
28 Cane 2004:448 
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ICSID Convention. It has been mentioned before in Section I, that some scholars have determined 
them through comparative interpretation of the texts of the Convention in different languages, as 
having identical meaning. However, case law has been treating them as different. In Letco v. Liberia 
the District Court of the Southern District of New York
29
 is ruling that “Liberia, as a signatory to the 
Convention, waived its sovereign immunity in the United States with respect to the enforcement of 
any arbitration award entered pursuant to the Convention. When it entered into the concession 
contract with LETCO, with its specific provision that any dispute thereunder be settled by 
arbitration under the rules of ICSID and its enforcement provision thereunder, it invoked the 
provision contained in Art. 54 of the Convention which requires enforcement of such an award by 
Contracting States... Therefore Liberia clearly contemplated the involvement of the courts of any of 
the Contracting states...in enforcing the pecuniary obligations of the award”. As a consequence of 
this conception the Court decided that enforcement was permissible, but the execution upon the 
funds attached
30
 with the writ of execution was not permissible on the basis of immunity from 
execution. It is clear that this ruling makes a distinction between enforcement and execution in the 
context of an ICSID arbitration. 
When it comes to ICSID awards it has been reasonably, to my opinion, noted by Nmehielle 
that “the question of immunity from execution should not be considered until after an award is 
recognized and funds have been attached to satisfy the award” (2001:34), as the ICSID Convention 
in regard to pecuniary obligations is attributing to the award both an immediate recognition and 
enforceability, it is when it comes to the actual seizure and disposal of the attached property that 
execution immunity is applicable. This argument is also consistent with the restrictive doctrine of 
sovereign immunity; enforcement is not absolutely forbidden, but it has to be examined in each 
particular case and in relation with the particular assets. 
Finally, an impediment to the enforcement of an ICSID award might be the stay of 
enforcement. This may be granted under Articles 50(2), 51(4) and 52(5) while proceedings for 
interpretation, revision or annulment are pending (UNCTAD 2003a:8). Annulment proceedings are 
those of more interest as they may be taking long, and by the stay of enforcement blocking the 
effectiveness of an ICSID award. What is distinguishing those proceedings from others is the fact 
that the ICSID Convention is a self-contained mechanism, providing for the annulment of the 
award, but not by domestic courts. According to Article 52(3) an ad hoc Committee is appointed by 
the Panel of Arbitrators to examine whether the grounds for annulment set forth in Article 52 
paragraph 1 are met. It is to be decided, according to Article 522(5), by the ad hoc Committee if it is 
                                                 
29 US District Court, Southern District of New York, 12 December 1986 
30 Tonnage and registration fees collected in the United States from ship-owners flying the Liberian flag, which were 
deposited in bank accounts held by the Embassy of Republic of Liberia in Washington D.C.   
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required to stay the enforcement till the issuance of the decision on the annulment. In case the 
award is annulled then a new Tribunal is constituted according to Article 52(5) to examine the 
dispute from scratch. As there is no specific provision determining the number of times an award 
may be annulled and re-examined the landscape is blurry, and a dispute might be endlessly 
examined and reexamined. As Nmehielle marks “the difficulty of this situation can be gleaned from 
two classic annulment requests from previous ICSID awards: Kloeckner Industrie Anlagen GmbH v. 
United Republic of Cameroon and AMCO Asia Corp. et al. v. Indonesia. These cases set the stage 
for the use of the ICSID annulment process.” (2001:43). The Kloeckner award was firstly rendered 
in 1983, finding the Cameroon’s debt to be extinguished by reason of Kloeckner's failure to perform 
its contractual obligations (the construction and operation of a fertilizer factory in Cameroon), 
particularly the presumed duty of full disclosure among partners. In 1984, Kloeckner filed a request 
for the annulment of the award, which was granted by the ad hoc Committee. The award was 
annulled in its entirety, citing, inter alia, a manifest excessive exercise of power by the Tribunal
31
, 
as consequence the whole dispute was re-examined in a second arbitration, without any res judicata 
to be applying. This arbitration procedure ended up in favour of Kloeckner who was granted a part 
of his claim; however, this award had been challenged for annulment by Cameroon.  
In the AMCO case the result has been similar as after the award was firstly rendered, a request 
for annulment had been found successful and after the second award a new request for annulment 
was made by both parties, AMCO and Indonesia
32
. Nmehielle makes a sharp comment on the 
deficiency of the annulment process of an ICSID award by stating that “while the availability of 
procedures to review arbitral awards may strengthen confidence in arbitration under the auspices of 
the ICSID, the Kloeckner and AMCO annulment decisions reveal inherent flaws in the concepts 








                                                 
31  “The annulment of the first Kloeckner award has been criticized on many grounds, the most important for 
purposes of this article being that the first ad hoc committee rejected the notion that its role and competence were 
limited to testing the award only in terms of the grounds listed in Article 52(1).” (Nmehielle 2001:44)  
32 For more information on the AMCO case see Nmehielle 2001:45-46. 
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III. Non-ICSID investment arbitral awards 
 
 The ICSID Convention is usually described as the cornerstone of investment arbitration and 
it is true that is one of the most important efforts in international level to regulate, institutionalize 
and set standards for the resolution of investment disputes in a forum that is thought to be 
independent. However, it is not the sole legal regime to be of concern as there are numerous 
investment disputes that have been arbitrated under the auspices of several international 
organizations and arbitration centers, or under ad hoc arbitration. We shall, summarily, make 
reference on the various investment arbitral awards, in order to link them with the following 
analysis on the topic of enforcement.  
 An arbitration clause, or agreement, or a provision in an International Investment Agreement 
is the way a State consents to arbitration and are those that determine among other aspects under 
which rules, under the auspices of which institution, the arbitration procedure will be held. There 
are cases that the treaty might provide for more than one option for arbitration. Such an example is 
the Energy Charter Treaty which in Article 26 provides for arbitration under the auspices of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or the ICSID Centre, or the Additional Facility of the ICSID 
Center or ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The selection among those 
options is to be crucial for the issue of enforcing the award against the recalcitrant state. 
 
a. ICSID Additional Facility Center 
 When the arbitration has been held under the auspices of the ICSID Center, the ICSID 
Convention is applicable with all the advantages that were analyzed in Section II. On the other 
hand, when the arbitration has been conducted according to the Additional Facility Rules
33
 Article 
54 of the ICSID Convention is not applicable (Cane 2004:441), thus there is no obligation to 
recognize and enforce pecuniary obligations and the award is governed by the national law of the 
place of arbitration and by any applicable treaty (UNCTAD 2003b:5-6). 
 In any of the abovementioned cases, different institutional arbitrations and ad hoc 
arbitration, it is of importance how this international investment arbitration award will be enforced 
against the State. We must hold in mind that in this essay we deal with cases that the award to be 
enforced is characterized by the element of internationality, found either in the enforcement process 
                                                 
33 This is the case that either the State (or any constituent subdivision or agency) or the State of the natural or legal 
person, called the investor, or even both are not contracting parties to the ICSID Convention; but choose to submit a 
request for arbitration to the Additional Facility of the ICSID Center, in this case the arbitration and the award rendered 
are not governed by the ICSID Convention. 
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or in the nature of the dispute. In the former case, internationality is attributed to the award by the 
fact that it has been either rendered in a State different from the one where recognition and 
enforcement is sought and in the later case, it is attributed according to the law of the place where 




b. The New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards 
 The most widespread international treaty on the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, in 
its number of contracting parties
35
 and its application, has been the New York Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed in the 10
th
 of June 1958, which 
entered into force on 7
th
 June 1959. The aspect that characterizes the New York Convention and 
distinguishes it from the ICSID Convention is that it establishes an obligation to enforce an award 
rendered in another jurisdiction, rather than a state's obligation to honor an award against it
36
. 
However it has been supported that "[a]n obligation to honor a treaty-based arbitration award may 
be implied if the respondent state has ratified the New York Convention." (Reed & Martinez 
2009:17-20). According to Article I (1) the Convention applies on awards “arising out from 
differences between persons, whether physical or legal”, there is no explicit reference to States, 
however “it is generally accepted that the expression also embraces persons of public law” and that 
it “is frequently applied to States and State agencies” (Van de Berg 2003:4). Enforcement under 
New York Convention is granted only for foreign arbitral awards, as described in Article I (1). The 
award does not need to be exclusively on investment disputes as in the ICSID arbitration
37
, but it 
can be in relation to disputes of commercial nature. It must be noted that investment disputes are to 
be found under the sense of commercial disputes, even if a reservation of Article I (3) is made by a 
Contracting State. 
 In Article III the obligation to recognize the award as binding and to enforce it, “in 
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the 
conditions laid down in the following articles” is provided. The conditions mentioned in this Article 
and described in Articles IV, V, VI are the ones constituting the above mentioned “dual step of the 
                                                 
34 On the meaning of a foreign arbitral award in regard to the New York Convention see Van de Berg 2003:2-3. 
35 The contracting parties from the moment of its signature have risen to the number of 149 States. 
36 Olson 2011:724 
37 In order a dispute to be arbitrated under the ICSID Convention it has to be determined that it is related to an 
investment according to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, however the term investment is not described or delimited 
by the Convention, so it has been a task run be ICSID arbitral tribunals resulting into different tests such as the Salini 
test (case Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco ) or the Phoenix test (case Phoenix 
Action Ltd v Czech Republic). 
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New York Convention”38; the check of the award in a domestic level to see whether it complies with 
the minimum legal guarantees set by this international convention in Article V and that it does not 
come into conflict with the legal order of the State where it is to be enforced
39
.  
 The conditions set by New York Convention concerning the recognition and the enforcement 
of a foreign arbitral award are the following: 
 Article IV 
1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding article, 
the party applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at the time of the application, 
supply:  
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof;  
(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy thereof. 
2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official language of the country in 
which the award is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and enforcement of 
the award shall produce a translation of these documents into such language. The 
translation shall be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or 
consular agent. 
 
  Article IV is describing the process to be followed in order to recognize and enforce 
the award, it is clear that this step is similar with the process followed when the investor is in 
possession of an ICSID award. However, while an ICSID award would directly be recognized 
and enforced with regard to the pecuniary obligations, any award attempted to be recognized 
and enforced through New York Convention will have to pass the dual step test described in 
Article V: 
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the 
party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority 
where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: 
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable 
to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to 
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of 
the country where the award was made; or 
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise 
                                                 
38 Cane 2004: 45 
39 The grounds set in Article V of the New York Convention for refusing to recognize and enforce an award are 
common with those found in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention for the annulment of an award (Cane 2004:444). 
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unable to present his case; or 
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the 
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the 
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters 
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the 
award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized 
and enforced; or 
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or 
(e) The award has not yet become binding, on the parties, or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
that award was made. 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the 
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds 
that:  
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration 
under the law of that country; or  
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy 
of that country. 
 
Shortly, the reasons for refusal of recognition and enforcement that must be invoked and 
proved by the respondent are: a) in reference to the arbitral agreement, incapacity of the parties to 
conclude such an agreement at the time they did, invalidity of the agreement according to the law 
governing the agreement or under lex arbitri , b) lack of notice and due process violations in 
relation to the arbitral proceeding, c) award outside or beyond the scope of the arbitration 
agreement, d) irregularities in the composition of arbitral tribunal or in the proceedings with regard 
to the arbitral agreement or lex arbitri and e) award not binding, set aside or suspended. 
Furthermore, the grounds for refusal of the request that are to be examined by the court ex officcio 
are the ones outlined in Article V (2).  They are related to the law of the State where the proceedings 
for recognition and enforcement take place, thus both a) the subject of the dispute is required to be 
arbitrable and b) the award must not be contrary to the public policy of this legal order. 
 The New York Convention sets as a priority the success of its legal regime and the need to 
be able to put pressure on recalcitrant parties, thus in relation to the ground for refusal of 




 If an application for the setting, aside or suspension of the award has been 
made to a competent authority referred to in article V (1) (e), the authority before 
which the award is sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the 
decision on the enforcement of the award and may also, on the application of the party 
claiming enforcement of the award, order the other party to give suitable security.  
 Thus, when a State might set under the attention of the court of enforcement that the award 
is not final and binding; the court of enforcement can stay the proceedings for recognition and 
enforcement and order suitable security. 
 Finally, as long as those requirements are met, the issue to be addressed is that of the relation 
between the New York Convention and state immunity. From a starting point, it does not include 
any specific rule of international law regarding immunity, thus the domestic conceptions of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity are to be applied
40
. The way national immunity law enters the New 
York Convention regime and proceedings is, firstly, through Article III which designates that the 
award has to be “ in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied 
upon” and, secondly, through Article V(2)(b) laying down the public policy exception41. 
 It is notable that even if we are seeking to enforce an investment award according to the 
New York Convention, as the investment might be related to a Bilateral Investment Treaty would 
lead to the complementing of New York Convention. It is obvious that this will be possible if there 
is no inconsistency between the two treaties. In this context it might be argued that an obligation to 
comply with the award set by the BIT might be an implied waiver of immunity execution and thus 
the award may be enforced (Bjorklund 2010:212). 
 Furthermore, it is because of the fact that it remains silent on the issue of sovereign 
immunity
42
 that “an implied waiver of execution immunity by virtue of an agreement to arbitrate is 
permissable”; however, its success depends on the municipal state immunity law. (Bjorklund 
2010:212, 220). According to Bjorklund, it must be noted that it has become of a wide application, 
but not of a universal, that “a State's agreement to arbitrate in a forum leading to a New York 
Convention award constitutes a waiver of immunity for jurisdictional purposes in any enforcement 
action” (2010:221). This perspective has been the approach taken by the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA) of U.S., after several courts in its jurisdiction had resulted in inconsistent 
                                                 
40 Olson 2011: 738 
41 Bjorklund 2010:219 
42 It seems reasonable that New York Convention does not address this issue, as in 1958 when it was contemplated it 
was primarily aiming into dealing with arbitral awards rendered after proceedings between private parties and not 




It is also present to the District Court's judgment for the District of Columbia ruling in 
M.B.L. International Contractors, Inc. v. Republic. of Trinidad and Tobago which notes “to accept 
Respondent's contention that it did not waive its sovereign immunity by agreeing to arbitrate this 
dispute under the terms of the [New York] Convention would defeat the very purpose of the 
Convention which is to provide for the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards... this Court rules 
that the Respondent must have contemplated the participation of the United States courts for 
enforcement of arbitration awards under the Convention.”43 Another jurisdiction which is thought to 
be favorable to the abovementioned argument is Switzerland, however, it requires that there is a 
connection between the assets and the subject matter of the dispute
44
.Additionally, the arbitral 
proceedings under ICC Rules leading to an arbitral award to be enforced in a New York Convention 
State is also argued to lead to an implied waiver of execution immunity as noted in Section I.  
 Concluding, the points expressed in this part in regard to enforcement of international 
investment arbitral awards under the New York Convention can be sum up by what Albert Van de 
Berg notes concerning its application: “in this field, the defense of sovereign immunity against 
recognition of the arbitration agreement and enforcement of the arbitral award is virtually always 
rejected on the basis of theories such as restrictive immunity, the waiver of immunity, the 
distinction between acta de jure gestionis and acta de jure imperii, the reliance on pacta sunt 
servanda and the creation of an ordre public réellement international. The foregoing encompasses 
also the proceedings for obtaining leave for enforcement, for which reason the defense of sovereign 
immunity usually fails in enforcement cases under the Convention. However, there remains a sharp 
(and some say illogical) distinction between immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from 
execution.” (2003:4-5). 
 Finally, in the event that a particular country is party to neither the ICSID nor the New York 
Conventions, then it may not be under the legal obligation to enforce an award. The investor 
holding an international investment award, shall look in BITs if there is a provision containing such 
an obligation for an arbitral award to be enforceable in the territory of each party to the given 
bilateral agreement
45
, or if mutual enforcement of awards pursuant to the domestic laws of the host 




                                                 
43 For the relation of  M.B.L. International Contractors, Inc. v. Republic of Trinidad and Tobago with LETCO 
case see Cane 2004:450 
44 Bjorklund 2010:224 
45 See  Article VI, 1992 United States/Russia BIT (UNCTAD 2003:64) 
46 See Article 7(5), 1992 Lithuania/Sweden BIT (UNCTAD 2003:64) 
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 suggests that in approximately 90% of cases the losing party complies 
voluntarily with the award; however recalcitrance is also a possibility. It is, then, of a question what 
an investor should do when dealing with a recalcitrant State. The State’s recalcitrance is possible to 
occur in different stages. Firstly, the State might refuse compliance with the award immediately 
after it has been rendered. Consequently, an investor might, also, find himself in such a position 
when he attempts to enforce the award, according to one of the Conventions or a BIT or domestic 
law provisions that where described in previous Sections of this essay, fail. It is at both these cases 
that a question raises; what are the means an investor has at his disposal in order to collect the 
money of the award, for which he has, probably, already spend additional sums from the initial 
capital of the investment. 
The measures which can be taken depend on which stage is the recalcitrance occurring, 
however, there are certain to be applied in both of the abovementioned situations, nevertheless their 
effectiveness is under consideration and differentiates from case to case.  
Therefore, an investor, in order to press for compliance, may choose among the following 
actions: 
a. Publicizing the Non-compliance  
This might be a tool in order to put pressure to a recalcitrant State. Noncompliance might be 
a disincentive to future investors; which respectively might be an impediment to a State, depending 
upon foreign investment to boost up its economy, to create infrastructure, even to finance its 
sovereign debt. This strategy has been described by Olson as “a cost-effective mean of encouraging 
compliance” (2011:729). However, it may not be one of the most effective as it has been 
demonstrated in the Yukos case where Russian Federation had been insisting on non-complying 
with the arbitration awards, despite its publicizing. It is, nevertheless, possible that publicizing 




b. Securing assets for enforcement 
An investor being in possession of an arbitral award and dealing with a recalcitrant State can 
take further action in order to secure that there will be assets over which he will enforce. The 
likelihood of the losing State striping itself from assets subject to enforcement, not covered by 
immunity from execution, is great. Thus, an investor may ask for interim measures of protection 
                                                 
47 See Mistelis & Baltag 2008 




while enforcement is pending, either from the tribunal or from a competent court, should they 
be available or attach those assets in order to forestall the transfer of assets out of the 




c. Waiver of execution immunity 
An investor could also act in an anticipatory way, ensuring that there will be a waiver of 
execution immunity that will permit the enforcement of a possible future award. Therefore, 
investors should be asking for waiver of execution immunity in contracts or BITs.  There has been 
an effort in international level to provide for such model clauses in order to avoid the negative 
effects of recalcitrance and not enforcement of the awards on the institution of international 
investment arbitration. Such an example is the model Clause 15 provided by the ICSID Center:  
“The Host State hereby waives any right of sovereign immunity as to it and its property in 
respect of the enforcement and execution of any award rendered by an Arbitral Tribunal constituted 
pursuant to this agreement.” 
However, this is not always viable as it depends on the bargaining power of the investor, when he is 
signing the investment contract or to its home-State in respect to the conclusion of a BIT. Moreover, 
as mentioned above in Section I, and in relation to Gouvernement de la Federation de Russie v. 
Compagnie de Noga d' Importation et d' Exportation it has been noted that “the explicit waiver of 
immunity from suit, execution and attachment does not always simplify the effectiveness of the 
enforcement of the award. Sometimes, the courts, even in the presence of an explicit clause of 
waiver, can read it extremely narrow and not give full satisfaction to the demand for execution.” 
(Cane 2004: 458). 
 
d. Political Risk Insurance-BIT award insurance 
An investor might also choose to insure its investment in the case the host-State does not 
comply with the award. There are mainly two categories, the first is described as political risk 
insurance and the second as BIT award insurance. The former, is mostly against asset appropriation 
or breach of contract, this kind of insurance is not the most favorable, as there are many factors to 
be taken into account, such as its limited coverage and the potential liability from the insurer’s point 
of view. The latter, is more popular and frequent; it covers an award rendered due to a violation of 
any BIT provision, rather than just an outright expropriation. This kind of coverage should be 
                                                 
49 Bjorklund 2010:235 
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obtained in an earlier point, so that its cost is competitive and not after the dispute has arisen, that 




e. Diplomatic Protection 
Diplomatic protection has been a traditionally used mean of pressing States to comply with 
arbitral awards and in generally to comply with the agreed terms of an investment. Diplomatic 
protection can still be found in international treaties, for instance in Article 27 (1) of the ICSID 
Convention where it is explicitly described as a step towards a recalcitrant State. It has been, mostly, 
used in the past when the today existing mechanisms where absent. A precondition to its application 
is the interference of the investor’s home-State; asking the host-State of the investment to comply 
with the award and to meet its obligations stemming from it. In general, diplomatic protection may 
be described as ineffective (Olson 2011: 731) and a political process to deal with the non-
compliance. Hence, bearing in mind the effort of the international community to de-politicize the 
disputes, stemming from international investment, it is nowadays thought to be a step backwards, 
with dubious results. Diplomatic protection is possible of taking various forms, thus an additional 
and a more effective way of exercising diplomatic protection can be in the form of economic 
pressure through sanctions imposed against the recalcitrant State. Even in this case the efficiency of 
this measure depends on the economic position of the latter State. It has been noted that the 
investor’s home-State might refrain from imposing sanctions against the host-State, because of the 
latter’s solid economic position that could end up having further negative implications for the 
investor’s home-State51. Economic sanctions are usually thought to be more legitimate when 
imposed by a larger number of states; in this way it is thought to be a multilateral kind of pressure 
towards a State’s compliance with the award. It has been proposed that international organizations 
could be able to put this pressure when needed, for instance through linking non-payment of 
investment arbitral awards to negative assessment of the credit-worthiness of the recalcitrant state, 
affecting their ability to borrow money from international mechanisms, such as the International 
Monetary Fund or by not giving loans in a favorable interest rate (Bjorklund 2010:214, 238). 
Furthermore, state to state arbitration can be an example of this category. It might be 
provided by BITs such as the Canada-U.S.S.R. BIT: “If any dispute cannot be settled through 
diplomatic channels, it shall, at the request of either Contracting Party, be submitted to an arbitral 
                                                 
50 For further information on the topic see Bjorklund 2010:234-235. 
51 See the Russian Federation case and its solid economic position that would possibly turn diplomatic protection into 
being an ineffective measure, having further implications Olson 2011:731 
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tribunal for decision”52. The effectiveness of state to state arbitration is disputed as a state might not 
take action to start arbitration against another state for the sake of its investor; it cannot be 
guaranteed that it will be a “universal” solution for every investment dispute arising. The investor’s 
State might also file an action on behalf of its investor to the International Court of Justice. 
However, this alternative it is not thought to be an effective one as the action of the investor’s State 
cannot be guaranteed and this procedure can be a lengthy process and with a non enforceable 
judgment; gathering different characteristics that are not thought to be complying with the needs of 














                                                 





When it comes to investing large sums of money in a foreign country, an investor as a 
business man is up into taking up some risk in order to raise his profit. However, because 
investment is usually a long-term allocation of money, subject to political change in the host-State, 
it is needed firstly to create, except of an economic, a legal favorable environment embedded with 
legal certainty. As demonstrated above, this had been the reason for States to conclude BITs that 
could create groundwork for enabling investment of foreign capital. Among the issues to be dealt 
with has been the possibility of a failure of the investment, thus within the context of BITs dispute 
mechanisms were provided, such as arbitration.  
Arbitration has been found as a resort, a non-biased, independent, fast and private, by 
investors, but even if it is bears those characteristics, its efficiency is depending on other aspects. It 
is when it comes to a State not complying with the award that a real issue arises. States as sovereign 
entities are enjoying special privileges when it comes to enforcement of the awards; this special 
privilege is sovereign immunity which is attributed to them by the State itself and the international 
community.  In order to circumvent this particularity, it is needed to examine in advance which are 
possibilities in the case of the investment’s failure, under which regime it will be subject. Of course, 
not every single aspect of the issues that are to be addressed in the case of a State being recalcitrant 
in to honoring the award can be known and secure in advance, as there are several conditions that 
might change till the moment the issue arises.  
What would be of importance is an attempt from the international community to clarify 
certain aspects that have stand as an impediment to the enforcement of awards. It is important to 
have an implicit waiver of immunity from execution, in BITs and contracts, to avoid 
misinterpretations. It is also crucial that the international community realizes the importance of a 
successful enforcement for the empowerment of international investment and that it should refrain 
from positions such as the one in Articles 54(3) and 55 of the ICSID Convention introducing 
municipal immunity law in respect to execution of the award.  
Additionally, introducing sanctions to recalcitrant States might be a measure in order to 
press states to comply with an award and to avoid any act of recalcitrance. However, the 
introduction of these measures should take a legal form, so that it will be controlled and 
depoliticized complying with the spirit of investment arbitration. 
A last point to be made is that we should bear in mind that despite the legal issues arising 
out of the noncompliance with the award there are other considerations to be taken into account. 
Indicatively, investment can in many cases be related with areas that are sensitive for the society 
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and might end up having important implications. For instance an arbitral award might have such a 
high sum of money to be paid that it might drain a State’s treasury or it might end up by its 
conduction to be affecting environment and the standard of living of the citizens. Thus, it is also a 
State’s responsibility to take seriously into consideration the terms of an investment and also the 
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